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—  Note  — 
Preventing Partisan 
Commitment: Applying Brady 
Protection to the Civil 
Commitment of Sex Offenders 
“Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect 
liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent . . . . The 
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men 
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”* 
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Introduction 
On March 8, 2002, Joseph Aaron Edwards appeared before the 
United States District Court for the District of Arizona.1 He was 
found guilty of committing “Sexual Abuse by Use of Force Against a 
Minor,” and for this crime Edwards faced a prison sentence of 
eighty-four months with five years of supervised release.2 Edwards 
served his punitive sentence as handed down by the federal court; 
however, less than a week before his release was scheduled, the 
Chairperson of the Bureau of Prison Certification Review Panel filed 
a certificate to civilly commit Edwards indefinitely under the federal 
 
*  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
1. United States v. Edwards, 777 F. Supp. 2d 985, 987 (E.D.N.C. 2011). 
2. Id. 
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sex offender commitment statute.3 Had the government not stipulated 
to dismiss Edwards’s case three years after his certification,4 he may 
have faced the same fate as thousands of other individuals in the 
United States who have already served time for sexual offenses:5 an 
indeterminate period of commitment, ending only after authorities 
determine that the individual is no longer a threat to society.6 This 
practice of civilly committing convicted sex offenders has been upheld 
as constitutional by the United States Supreme Court and is currently 
implemented both by the federal government and a significant 
number of states.7 What is unnerving, however, is that while 
Edwards’s commitment proceeding may have resulted in an indefinite 
loss of liberty, the government prosecutors chose to withhold an 
expert report which concluded that Edwards did not meet the criteria 
necessary to be committed.8 A convenient excuse for the government’s 
action is that even with the possibility of a significant loss of liberty, 
Edwards’s commitment was a civil action and thus did not require the 
same procedural protections as in a criminal trial.9 Few courts or 
commentators have addressed whether the prosecution’s use of 
selective disclosure is a valid practice, or if the same protection that 
 
3. Id. at 987–88. See infra Part I.B for a deeper discussion of the federal 
sex offender commitment statute. 
4. Id. at 989. 
5. Id. at 995 (noting that “erroneous deprivations of liberty” could result 
without greater protection); see also Andrew J. Harris, The Civil 
Commitment of Sexual Predators: A Policy Review, in Sex Offender 
Laws: Failed Policies, New Directions 340 (Richard G. Wright 
ed., 2009) (noting that “[a]s of mid-2007 over 4,500 individuals had been 
committed under state statutes” aimed at the civil commitment of 
sexually violent predators). 
6. See Harris, supra note 5, at 340 (“In most states, commitments are for 
an indeterminate period, with mental health authorities retaining 
custody until the individual is determined to no longer pose a threat to 
society.”). 
7. See infra Part I.B. 
8. Edwards, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 989. 
9. See Nora V. Demleitner, Abusing State Power or Controlling Risk?: Sex 
Offender Treatment and Sicherungverwahrung, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 
1621, 1632 (2003) (“Nevertheless, [the Supreme Court] has found 
commitment statutes for so-called ‘sexual predators’ civil, and therefore 
exempt from the protections that generally apply in criminal cases.”); 
Meaghan Kelly, Note, Lock Them Up—And Throw Away the Key: The 
Preventative Detention of Sex Offenders in the United States and 
Germany, 39 Geo. J. Int’l L. 551, 557 (2008) (noting that fewer 
constitutional protections apply to commitment proceedings because the 
commitment statutes “are construed as civil and rehabilitative instead 
of criminal and punitive”). 
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prohibits such strategy in the criminal context is required in sex 
offender commitment hearings.  
In Edwards, the government argued that as a party to sex 
offender commitment hearings it had a “general right of broad 
discretion in designating experts” and a “right to ignore and not 
disclose any expert that produces reports favorable to the detainees.”10 
Had the matter been a criminal trial, such a strategy by the 
government would constitute a clear violation of the procedural 
safeguards first established by Brady v. Maryland.11 Brady introduced 
the well-known rule that in criminal cases the prosecution’s 
suppression of exculpatory material evidence violates the defendant’s 
constitutional right to due process.12 Few courts have addressed the 
extension of these protections to civil commitment proceedings despite 
the distinct similarities between involuntary commitment and 
criminal prosecution. This Note posits that while the involuntary 
commitment of sexually violent predators is formalistically a civil 
procedure, its quasi-criminal nature and unique reliance upon expert 
testimony requires the heightened protection of the traditionally 
criminal Brady safeguard. Scholars have amassed a great amount of 
research regarding more general constitutional protections afforded to 
defendants in sexual predator commitment hearings,13 but little, if 
any, academic work has discussed the specific application of Brady to 
 
10. Edwards, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 989. While the government maintained 
that it had these general rights to withhold expert testimony, it 
conceded that in the Edwards case it was required to turn over the 
report in question based on a standing order both parties had previously 
agreed upon. The order required the government to disclose “all medical 
and psychological records in the possession of the Bureau of Prisons . . . 
or the government.” Id. at 988 & n.8 (quoting In re Procedures for 
Commitments Under U.S.C. § 4248, 10-S0-01 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 4, 2010)). 
The court in Edwards expressed concern with the government’s 
perception of its general right, and noted that there exists no 
information as to whether this lack of disclosure was an isolated event 
or whether the government has failed to disclose expert reports in 
similar commitment cases. Id. at 989. 
11. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
12. Id. at 87. 
13. Specifically, after United States v. Comstock, 627 F.3d 513 (4th Cir. 
2010), there has been work analyzing what burden of proof is required 
to commit convicted sex offenders. See generally Tamara Rice Lave, 
Throwing Away the Key: Has the Adam Walsh Act Lowered the 
Threshold for Sexually Violent Predator Commitments Too Far?, 14 U. 
Pa. J. Const. L. 391, 411–17 (2011) (noting that many states set a 
higher burden of proof requirement than U.S. Constitution requires); 
Alexander Tsesis, Due Process in Civil Commitments, 38 Wash & Lee 
L. Rev. 253, 260–72 (2011) (arguing for a “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard).  
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commitment hearings.14 This Note will demonstrate that despite its 
“civil” label, like a criminal proceeding, the involuntary commitment 
of sex offenders requires the heightened protection of Brady. 
Part I will explore the development of civil commitment statutes 
in the United States. This discussion does not attempt to challenge 
whether the civil commitment of sex offenders is meritorious in theory 
but instead focuses on the policies that drove the enactment of such 
statutes and their practical implementation. The goals and objectives 
of sex offender commitment statutes lay a foundation for 
understanding why commitment defendants require the protection of 
the Brady Rule. Part II focuses on the development of the Brady 
Rule. While this procedural safeguard evolved through criminal cases, 
the discussion will explore the policies that drive Brady’s use in 
criminal hearings and posit that those same policies dually support 
the rule’s application in sex offender commitment hearings.  
Part III will then make a case for Brady’s application to sex 
offender commitment proceedings. First, the discussion will focus on 
the criminal-like aspects of sex offender commitment that trigger the 
need for heightened Brady protection. Specifically, this Note will 
propose that the State’s role in the proceedings and the severe 
consequences of sexually violent predator commitment require that 
the prosecution disclose relevant exculpatory evidence under Brady. 
Moreover, this Note will explain how Brady is already applied in 
other quasi-criminal hearings, such as extradition hearings,15 
suggesting that its use in sex offender commitment is not as radical as 
it may initially seem.  
Second, this Note will argue that the evidentiary realities common 
in civil commitment proceedings compel Brady’s application. The 
fact-finder’s extraordinary reliance on expert testimony that varies 
considerably from expert to expert suggests that a fair and just 
decision cannot be made without full disclosure of exculpatory 
evidence.  
Third, this Note posits that the application of the Brady Rule to 
sexual predator commitment proceedings will be much more 
straightforward than its current utilization in traditional criminal 
proceedings. Due to the fact-finder’s heavy reliance on expert 
testimony, much less ambiguity will exist as to whether the evidence 
in the government’s possession should be disclosed, ensuring a simpler 
method of compliance. 
 
14. Such little attention to the specific issue addressed in this Note may, in 
part, be due to the dearth of any legal decisions addressing this specific 
issue. See Edwards, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 989 (finding that the issue of 
Brady Rule application to the commitment of sexually violent predators 
was an issue of first impression).  
15. See infra Part III.A. 
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I. Development of Sex Offender Commitment 
A. History of Civil Commitment 
Civil commitment generally refers to the government’s 
involuntary hospitalization of individuals with mental disorders.16 
Traditionally the State commits these individuals both to provide 
treatment for their disorder and because the individuals pose a danger 
to themselves or to those around them.17 This practice has been used 
in some form by governments since the ancient world.18  
Civil commitment has been present through all of American 
history, with some form utilized by the first settlers in the early days 
of the American colonies, although the first hospitals for the exclusive 
care of the mentally disabled were not established until 1773.19 
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, reforms were put in place in 
an attempt to add more legitimacy to the commitment process.20 
However, this movement to create a more regulated process and to 
encourage more fruitful treatment was short lived. The early 
twentieth century again found a number of changes to the 
commitment laws; however, most of these modifications were put in 
place to facilitate an easier commitment process rather than to 
protect the rights of those committed.21 
 
16. GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE 
COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND 
LAWYERS 325 (3d ed. 2007). 
17. See id. (defining civil commitment as “the state-sanctioned involuntary 
hospitalization of individuals with mental disorders who require 
treatment, care, or incapacitation because of self-harming or dangerous 
tendencies”). 
18. See id. at 327. From ancient Rome through the Middle Ages, 
governments used similar methods to address individuals with mental 
disorders. For example, in thirteenth-century England, the King took 
control of the property of anyone designated an “idiot” and served as a 
guardian, using any profits from the guardianship to maintain the 
individual’s personal care and household. Id. This process eventually 
included a procedure whereby a jury determined the classification of the 
mentally disabled—either an “idiot” or a “lunatic”—and, depending on 
the classification, the subject was confined to either public housing or to 
the care of friends or relatives who were paid for their service. Id.  
19. Id. 
20. See id. (“[R]eform efforts . . . stimulated cosmetic changes in commit-
ment laws, some reformation of existing facilities, and the construction 
of new ones.”). 
21. See id. (noting that this move toward streamlining the commitment 
process was, in part, a result of medical advances that led to more 
optimistic feelings about the effectiveness of the treatment committed 
individuals were receiving). 
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This tide of streamlined commitment practices was briefly 
stemmed in the mid-twentieth century. Beginning in the 1970s, the 
legal community led a revitalized reform movement that addressed, 
among other things, the treatment received by those committed and 
the criteria reviewed during the commitment process.22 This careful 
examination of the government’s commitment practices provoked 
much needed judicial review, and beginning in the late 1970s, the 
Supreme Court issued a number of decisions that simultaneously shed 
light on the justifications for such an invasive practice and showcased 
the Court’s enduring principle that civil commitment was a special 
procedure that required safeguards above and beyond normal civil 
protections.  
In O’Connor v. Donaldson,23 the Court narrowed the breadth of 
involuntary commitment and established the precedent that such an 
invasive action was only constitutional when applied narrowly enough 
to reach only specific dangerous individuals.24 In Donaldson the Court 
reviewed the nearly fifteen-year civil commitment of an individual 
who was confined for suffering from paranoid schizophrenia.25 The 
fifteen-year detention had continued based solely on his condition, 
despite testimony that he posed no threat to his or others’ safety 
during his time of confinement or any other time during his life.26 The 
ultimate holding in Donaldson articulated that “a State cannot 
constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who 
is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of 
willing and responsible family members or friends.”27 In reaching this 
narrow conclusion, the Court was influenced by the significant loss of 
liberty a commitment defendant faces and the difficulty in 
determining whether an individual has a mental illness.28  
 
22. Id. at 328–30. This rebirth of the reform movement also examined the 
medical model implemented in commitment procedures, specifically 
questioning the credibility of the psychiatric profession and whether 
mental illness was truly definable. Id. at 329. Challenges to the 
consequences of commitment focused on the conditions of the facilities 
where the committed received their “treatment” and the loss of liberty 
that necessarily accompanied the commitment. Id. at 329–30. The 
challenge to the criteria used in commitment grew from the belief that 
“mental illness” was a term that could be easily manipulated and the 
process put many in danger of being committed without receiving 
appropriate due process protections. Id. at 330. 
23. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 564–66. 
26. Id. at 568. 
27. Id. at 576. 
28. See Tsesis, supra note 13, at 262. 
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Donaldson demonstrates how, even from the earliest days, the 
Court viewed involuntary commitment as an amorphous breed of civil 
action. While this ruling curtailed the broad nature of civil 
commitment, the Court in Donaldson refrained from clearly 
articulating the constitutional limitations of commitment and “did 
not endorse explicitly any of the libertarian reforms adopted by the 
lower courts.”29 Thus, while the holding in Donaldson suggested that 
involuntary commitment requires special protection, the Court did 
not clearly define exactly what or how many protections were 
required. 
The Court’s next major commitment decision further outlined the 
heightened protections required of involuntary commitment and 
secured its place somewhere between the traditional civil and criminal 
realms. In Addington v. Texas,30 the Court confirmed that a clear and 
convincing evidence standard of proof is suitable to satisfy due process 
requirements in civil commitment hearings.31 In Addington, the 
defendant in a Texas commitment proceeding was found by a jury to 
be mentally ill and to require involuntary hospitalization.32 The jury 
made this finding “[b]ased on clear, unequivocal, and convincing 
evidence” rather than the burden of proof ordinarily used in civil 
cases of a preponderance of the evidence or that traditionally required 
in criminal cases of beyond a reasonable doubt.33 In affirming this 
standard, the Court acknowledged that while involuntary 
commitment was not formally a criminal procedure, “civil 
commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of 
liberty that requires due process protection.”34 In the Court’s eyes this 
potential deprivation of liberty required stricter safeguards than 
traditional civil matters. Thus, defendants facing involuntary hospit-
alization could not be committed without “proof more substantial 
than a mere preponderance of evidence.”35 
 
29. Melton et al., supra note 16, at 331. 
30. 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 421. 
33. Id. The defendant in Addington argued that the nature of civil 
commitment required a burden of proof equal to the criminal standard 
and that any use of a lesser standard was a violation of his 
constitutional right of due process. Id. at 421–22. 
34. Id. at 425. 
35. Id. at 427. In making its determination that the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard was not required, the Court noted that there is less 
chance of erroneous conviction in commitment proceedings due to the 
multiple levels of professional review and concern of friends and family. 
Id. at 428–29. Moreover, the Court questioned the certainty of 
psychiatric diagnosis and seriously questioned whether the state, relying 
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In both these early cases the Court made it clear that involuntary 
commitment involves a significant deprivation of liberty, which 
requires heightened protections, setting it apart from traditional civil 
proceedings. Thus, from day one, involuntary commitment was 
planted in uncharted territory—a unique proceeding that was 
formally civil, but with consequences too severe for normal civil 
protections. 
B. Civil Commitment Statutes Applied to Sex Offenders 
It was with this groundwork that states began to enact 
involuntary commitment statutes that exclusively targeted those 
individuals whom the state deemed to be “sexually violent.” These 
contemporary sexually violent predator36 (“SVP”) statutes had their 
start as early as the mid-twentieth century, when sex offenders 
became the focus of general civil commitment procedures.37 However, 
the first statute to include language directly aimed at the 
commitment of sex offenders did not appear until the Washington 
state legislature enacted the Community Protection Act in 1990.38 
The catalyst to Washington’s statute was an overwhelming response 
to a particularly heinous sex crime that had been committed by a  
on this somewhat fallible evidence, could ever prove an individual’s 
mental illness and likelihood of dangerousness beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Id. at 429. 
36. At least one commentator has suggested that the term “sexually violent 
predator” is an emotionally charged term that can sometimes be 
misleading or inaccurate. Adam Deming, Sex Offender Civil 
Commitment Programs: Current Practices, Characteristics, and 
Resident Demographics, 36 J. Psychiatry & L. 439, 443 (2008). This 
designation is given to committed sex offenders in eleven states, while 
“sexually dangerous person” is given in Massachusetts and Wisconsin, 
“sexually dangerous individual” in North Dakota, and at times “sexually 
psychopathic personality” is used in Minnesota. Id. at 442–43. While 
acknowledging that the use of “sexually violent predator” may be a 
point of contention among some scholars, this Note will continually refer 
to “sexually violent predators” and “sexually violent predator statutes” 
for no reason other than the fact that a majority of states use this 
designation. 
37. See Demleitner, supra note 9, at 1629 (“Starting in the 1950s, sexual 
psychopaths, however defined, were targeted for indefinite detention.”). 
As early as the late 1930s, some states began enacting “sexual 
psychopath” laws. States such as Illinois created procedures that took 
the place of a criminal trial and resulted in the commitment of those 
who were found to be suffering from a mental illness and had “criminal 
propensities to the commission of sex offenses.” Raquel Blacher, 
Comment, Historical Perspective of the “Sex Psychopath” Statute: From 
the Revolutionary Era to the Present Federal Crime Bill, 46 Mercer L. 
Rev. 889, 897–900 (1995) (quoting Criminal Sexual Psychopathic 
Persons Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 820 (1938)). 
38. Harris, supra note 5, at 339; Wash Rev. Code § 71.09 (2014). 
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recently released sex offender.39 Unsurprisingly, this type of sweeping 
social reaction is often the driving force behind many of the SVP laws 
enacted by states across the country.40  
After the passage of Washington’s groundbreaking law, a number 
of other states began implementing their own form of SVP 
commitment statutes, with increased legislative activity coming after 
New Jersey’s enactment of Meghan’s Law41 in 1994.42 Currently, 
twenty states have enacted some form of involuntary commitment for 
sex offenders.43 The federal government joined the States in 2006 with 
the adoption of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act44 
 
39. See Harris, supra note 5, at 344 (noting that Washington’s law was 
prompted by the 1989 abduction, rape, and mutilation of a seven-year-
old boy by Earl Shriner, a convicted sex offender who had been released 
from prison only two years before, after serving a ten-year sentence for 
sexually assaulting two teenage girls).  
40. See id. at 344 (finding that the connection of heinous sex crimes with 
the subsequent enactment of SVP commitment legislation “is not 
limited to Washington but rather represents a fairly pervasive theme 
across states”); see also Corey Rayburn Yung, Sex Offender 
Exceptionalism and Preventive Detention, 101 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 969, 974–75 (2011) (noting that heinous, high-profile sex 
crimes sparked a general trend toward more restrictive sex offender 
laws, including SVP commitment statutes as well as registration and 
residency requirements); Blacher, supra note 37, at 899–900 (noting that 
even the initial sexual psychopath laws of the early twentieth century 
were driven by society’s belief that it was “failing in its duty to protect 
the public” if it subjected women and children to sexual criminals after 
they had been released from their criminal sentences). 
41. N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:7-1–7-11 (West 2014) (§ 2C:7-11 repealed 
2014). 
42. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, 1-2 Mental Disability Law: Civil and 
Criminal § 2A-3.3 (2013); see also Blacher, supra note 37, at 915–16 
(discussing the circumstances that precipitated the enactment of 
Meghan’s Law). 
43. Harris, supra note 5, at 339. Most SVP commitment statutes were 
passed during the 1990s, immediately following the inaugural 
Washington statute. Id. However, some states have passed SVP 
legislation as recently as 2008. Krauss et al., Dangerously 
Misunderstood: Representative Jurors’ Reactions to Expert Testimony 
on Future Dangerousness in a Sexually Violent Predator Trial, 18 
Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 18, 19 (2011). As of 2008, the complete list 
of states with SVP commitment statutes consists of: Arizona, California, 
Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and 
Wisconsin. Deming, supra note 36, at 441.  
44. 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2012). 
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(“AWA”), which included a federal SVP civil commitment provision.45 
Recent estimates show the number of sex offenders committed under 
the federal and state statutes to be over 4,500.46 
Though each state has its own statute, the process of SVP 
commitment follows the same general procedure. The government 
typically waits to begin the commitment process until the defendant 
is about to be released from prison.47 Once the government has 
identified the defendant as a potential SVP, the Department of 
Health, guided by psychiatric professionals, determines whether the 
defendant is likely to be an SVP.48 If the government affirms such a 
finding, the prosecutor then files a petition of commitment with the 
relevant court.49 If the court finds probable cause that the inmate is 
an SVP, then the government can initiate a commitment proceeding 
in the form of a trial, where a factfinder must determine whether the 
defendant is truly an SVP and thus should be involuntarily 
committed.50  
While the phrasing of each SVP commitment statute can be 
moderately distinctive, the SVP commitment process generally 
requires that the judge or jury find three elements during the 
commitment hearing: (1) The individual has previously engaged in 
harmful sexual conduct, (2) the individual suffers from a mental 
disorder, and (3) the individual is likely to engage in harmful sexual 
conduct in the future.51 For most of these statutes, if the defendant is 
 
45. Id.; see also Yung, supra note 40, at 978 (describing the enactment of 
the AWA and explaining its specific elements). 
46. Melissa Hamilton, Public Safety, Individual Liberty, and Suspect 
Science: Future Dangerousness Assessments and Sex Offender Laws, 83 
Temp. L. Rev. 697, 704 (2011); Harris, supra note 5, at 340. 
47. Hamilton, supra note 46, at 704. The purpose of waiting this long to 
initiate the proceedings is to allow the defendant to serve his full 
sentence before they are committed for treatment, thus never allowing 
the individual to leave some form of custody. Id.; see also Jeslyn A. 
Miller, Comment, Sex Offender Civil Commitment: The Treatment 
Paradox, 98 Cal. L. Rev. 2093, 2096–98 (2010) (noting that the 
contemporary SVP commitment statutes, beginning with Washington’s 
1990 statute, operated as an extension of previously served prison 
sentences in order for the government to keep sex offenders in custody 
for as long as they were considered threats to society). 
48. John L. Schwab, Note, Due Process and “The Worst of the Worst”: 
Mental Competence in Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment 
Proceedings, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 912, 917–18 (2012) (explaining the 
procedure used in California as an example of the commitment process). 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Eric S. Janus & Paul E. Meehl, Assessing the Legal Standard for 
Predictions of Dangerousness in Sex Offender Commitment 
Proceedings, 3 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 33, 34 (1997). These 
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found to be an SVP, he is confined indefinitely, undergoes yearly 
evaluations, and is not to be released until it can be shown that he is 
no longer a danger to society.52 
Though SVP commitment statutes are closely related offshoots of 
traditional civil commitment statutes, these elements suggest a 
significant difference in objectives. Traditional civil commitment 
statutes focus on the danger that the individual poses to himself or 
others.53 Through providing the individual with proper treatment, 
these laws aim for temporary confinement with the ultimate goal of 
enabling the committed individual to live a normal life after he is 
released.54  
SVP commitment statutes focus on the individual’s criminal 
history and the danger that the individual poses to those around him 
because of his mental disorder.55 Unlike traditional involuntary 
commitment, the treatment objective of SVP commitment “seems to 
be distinctly subordinate to the public safety–oriented purpose of 
incapacitation.”56 Proponents admit such a policy and have long 
argued that the purpose of such commitment is “to protect society 
from a small but dangerous group of individuals who continue to pose 
 
elements are found in all SVP commitment statutes in some form 
despite each statute’s unique language. For example, the AWA requires 
a finding that the subject of the commitment proceeding is “sexually 
dangerous,” meaning he “has engaged or attempted to engage in 
sexually violent conduct or child molestation and who is sexually 
dangerous to others.” Charles Doyle, Adam Walsh Child Protection and 
Safety Act: A Legal Analysis, in Adam Walsh Child Protection 
and Safety Act: Analysis and Law 84 (Terrell G. Sandoval ed., 
2010). “Sexually dangerous to others” means the individual “suffers from 
a serious mental illness, abnormality or disorder as a result of which he 
would have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct 
or child molestation if released.” Id.; see also John Matthew Fabian, To 
Catch a Predator, and Then Commit Him for Life: Sexual Offender Risk 
Assessment—Part Two, The Champion, Mar. 2009, at 32, 32 
(explaining the differences between the elements required in most state 
statutes and the those required under the AWA). 
52. See Perlin, supra note 42, at § 2A-3.3 (“[R]elease is allowed when it is 
shown that the offender is no longer dangerous by reason of mental 
disorder.”); Miller, supra note 47, at 2110 (explaining that in most 
states defendants are confined until “they are no longer considered 
dangerous to the community”). 
53. Demleitner, supra note 9, at 1628–29. 
54. See id. at 1629 (“The goal of civil commitment statutes is to provide an 
effective therapy to persons committed, so as to enable them to live 
independently upon release.”). 
55. Id. 
56. Prentky et al., Sexually Violent Predators in the Courtroom: Science on 
Trial, 12 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 357, 380 (2006). 
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a threat to society following completion of their formal criminal 
sanctions.”57 This focus on the individual’s potential harm to others 
and the concomitant lack of focus on the committed individuals’ 
recovery leads to the conclusion that these laws are designed 
primarily to protect others by keeping the committed individuals in 
some form of custody rather than treating them for their illness.58 
However, even proponents agree that these laws are not meant to 
apply to every individual who has served a sentence for a sexually 
related crime but rather to address only a small, dangerous group. 
This limited application to those determined to be sexually violent is 
a lynchpin for upholding the statutes’ constitutionality.59 Thus 
amplifying the importance of committing only those with the requisite 
dangerous characteristics. 
As one would expect, statutes requiring an individual to be 
committed indefinitely following a full criminal sentence were and 
continue to be highly controversial.60 What naturally followed the 
initial legislation was a slew of constitutional challenges.61 Like in the 
challenges to traditional commitment, the judiciary attempted to 
define what protections were required from this formalistically civil 
hearing.  
The most influential of these challenges came after Kansas 
enacted its Sexually Violent Predator Act in 1994.62 In Kansas v. 
Hendricks,63 the Court made it clear that in SVP commitment 
hearings, heightened safeguards are necessary to ensure due process.64 
Leroy Hendricks, an inmate with a long history of molesting children, 
challenged his commitment, which came just before his release date in 
 
57. Harris, supra note 5, at 340. 
58. See Demleitner, supra note 9, at 1629 (arguing that SVP commitment 
statutes are “aimed primarily at incapacitation rather than treatment”). 
59. See Janus & Meehl, supra note 51, at 34 (arguing that this narrow 
target range “is necessary if the State’s interest in protecting its 
citizenry from sexual attack is to be sufficiently compelling to warrant 
the confinements”); see also Fabian, supra note 51, at 47 (“There is no 
question that the goal of these civil commitment statutes is to identify a 
small but extremely dangerous group of sexual predators who do not 
have a traditional mental disease or defect that renders them 
appropriate candidates for involuntary commitment.”).  
60. Harris, supra note 5, at 340. 
61. See id. at 351 (noting that the initial constitutional challenges can be 
broken down into “two major categories—those related to the allegedly 
punitive intent of the laws, and those related to the state’s civil power 
to exert custody over the individuals”). 
62. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a (1994). 
63. 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
64. Id. 
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September 1994.65 Hendricks argued that the Kansas SVP act was 
unconstitutional on substantive due process, double jeopardy, and ex 
post facto grounds.66 The Court, in a 5–4 decision, upheld the Kansas 
statute, noting that, like traditional involuntary commitment, SVP 
commitment statutes are in fact civil and not punitive in nature.67 In 
making this determination, the Court again stressed the unique 
position of involuntary commitment laws in that the SVP 
commitment defendant must still be afforded “strict procedural 
safeguards” due to the significant loss of liberty they face.68 In 
response to Hendricks’s argument that the use of criminal procedural 
safeguards rendered the statute criminal in nature, the Court found 
that the safeguards were simply a product of the State’s imposition of 
requisite protections; dutifully “confin[ing] only a narrow class of 
particularly dangerous individuals” after meeting “the strictest 
procedural safeguards.”69 
Subsequently, in United States v. Comstock,70 the Supreme Court 
upheld the first-ever constitutional challenge to the federally enacted 
SVP commitment statute.71 On remand, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed the defendant’s procedural 
due process claim, and relying heavily on Addington, the court upheld 
a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof.72 The Fourth 
Circuit explained the direct relationship between the procedural 
safeguards required in SVP commitment statutes and the dire 
consequences of such laws, specifically noting that “[t]he procedures 
required before the government acts often depend on the nature and 
extent of the burden or the deprivation to be imposed . . . .”73 
Some important points emerge from these cases. First, it is 
apparent that these contemporary SVP commitment statutes have 
grown out of traditional civil commitment statutes, but they are 
distinctly aimed at a unique problem. Like traditional civil 
commitment, SVP commitment seeks to rehabilitate, but the central 
objective is to protect society from a specific group of dangerous  
65. Id. at 353–56. 
66. Id. at 350. 
67. Id. at 368–69. 
68. Id. at 357 (finding that the Court has “consistently upheld such 
involuntary commitment statutes provided the confinement takes place 
pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards”). 
69. Id. at 364.  
70. 560 U.S. 126 (2010). 
71. Id. at 149 (upholding the federal statute under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause). 
72. United States v. Comstock, 627 F.3d 513, 519–24 (4th Cir. 2010). 
73. Id. at 524 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 325 (1993)). 
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individuals. Consequently, the goals of SVP commitment are served 
only when the commitment proceedings provide accurate classification 
that, to the greatest extent possible, precisely identifies an individual 
as sufficiently dangerous to meet the threshold for commitment. As 
Part III will show, the current state of psychological analysis and the 
government’s ability to withhold exculpatory evidence prevents this 
vital accuracy. 
Second, while these contemporary SVP commitment statutes are 
not punitive, the Supreme Court continues to recognize that they do 
result in a significant deprivation of liberty74 and thus require 
heightened safeguards. At the same time, the Court has not 
concretely defined the parameters of these protections. Rather, the 
language suggests that the protections must be proportional to the 
consequences the defendant may suffer if convicted. In response, many 
states have already incorporated certain criminal procedural 
safeguards within their SVP commitment statutes, such as the right 
to an attorney, the right to present expert witnesses, and the right to 
a trial by jury.75 Part III will submit that, given the striking 
similarities between a criminal sentence and SVP commitment, the 
Court’s call for adequate safeguards cannot be fully answered without 
implementation of the Brady Rule.  
II. Development of the Brady Rule 
The Brady Rule originated from the 1963 case of Brady v. 
Maryland.76 The central point of contention arose after Brady and his 
co-defendant were found guilty of murder. Before trial, Brady’s 
counsel requested that the prosecution turn over the co-defendant’s 
statements for examination.77 The prosecution disclosed a number of 
the co-defendant’s statements but chose to withhold one specific 
 
74. Tsesis, supra note 13, at 260–61 (noting that the court firmly 
acknowledged this significant curtailment of freedom even as early as 
the 1960s). In fact, even before the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Addington, lower courts acknowledged civil commitment’s monumental 
threat to liberty. The highest court in Oklahoma noted that 
“[i]nvoluntary commitment to a mental hospital involves a massive 
curtailment of an individual’s liberty, and in many ways resembles a 
criminal arrest because the individual is taken into custody by the police 
and, eventually, involuntarily confined in a state institution.” Id. at 277 
(quoting In re Mental Health of D.B.W., 616 P.2d 1149, 1152 (Okla. 
1980)). 
75. Schwab, supra note 48, at 914.  
76. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
77. Id. at 84. Brady had admitted during trial that he had contributed to 
the murder but consistently claimed that his co-defendant had done the 
actual killing and asked the jury not to return a capital verdict. Id.  
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statement in which the co-defendant admitted to the homicide.78 
Brady was given no notice of this evidence until after he had been 
tried, convicted, and sentenced to death.79 The Supreme Court found 
that this suppression was a violation of Brady’s due process rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment and laid down the foundation of 
the contemporary Brady Rule: “We now hold that the suppression by 
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request 
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or 
to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution.”80 
Since day one there has been a special relationship between the 
Brady Rule and the defendant facing a deprivation of liberty. While it 
would seem that the protection was established to reprimand 
prosecutors, Brady and its progeny suggest the rule was created with 
an eye toward the protection of the defendant rather than the 
punishment of prosecutors.81 The Court’s opinion in Brady suggests 
that, at the most basic level, the motivation behind the rule was to 
ensure that a defendant is not deprived of his or her liberty without 




80. Id. at 87. 
81. See Michael Avery, Paying for Silence: The Liability of Police Officers 
Under Section 1983 for Suppressing Exculpatory Evidence, 13 Temp. 
Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 1, 19 (“Brady, and the cases that preceded 
it and followed it, did not focus on the culpability of government 
actors . . . . Rather the focus of these decisions was on the impact on an 
accused person when exculpatory information is not furnished, that is, 
on whether the government had given the defendant a fair opportunity 
to defend himself.”). 
82. The Court agreed with the ruling of the Maryland Court of Appeals, 
explaining that:  
This ruling was an extension of Mooney v. Holohan, where the 
Court ruled on what nondisclosure by a prosecutor violates due 
process: “It is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be 
satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a State has contrived a 
conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but 
used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a 
deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of 
testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a State 
to procure a conviction of imprisonment of a defendant is as 
inconsistent with rudimentary demands of justice as is the 
obtaining of a like result by intimidation.” 
 
 Brady, 373 U.S. at 86 (citations omitted) (quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 
294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935)); see also James R. Acker & Catherine L. 
Bonventre, Protecting the Innocent in New York: Moving Beyond 
Changing Only Their Names, 73 Alb. L. Rev. 1245, 1275 (2010) 
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inherently adversarial, the Court maintained that the government’s 
goal is “not to achieve victory, but to establish justice”83 and that 
“‘[t]he United States wins its point whenever justice is done its 
citizens in the courts.’”84 The Court went on to stress that this 
interest of justice requires that the prosecutor not act as an 
“architect” of the proceeding, shaping the outcome of the trial by 
choosing whether to disclose certain evidence.85 In the fifty years 
following this seminal holding, the Brady Rule has been reworked 
extensively. However, Brady’s progeny has continually echoed the 
same justifications for this evidentiary safeguard: that fairness and 
justice are not served by allowing the government to drastically 
influence a trial’s outcome through its decision to disclose or withhold 
evidence.  
The first major adjustment to the Brady Rule came in the 1976 
case of United States v. Agurs,86 where the Court determined whether 
a defendant’s request was a prerequisite to the disclosure required 
under Brady.87 The government argued that it was not required to 
turn over the relevant exculpatory evidence because it had never 
received a request from Agurs and therefore had no duty to disclose.88 
In response, the Court held that even if no request had been made, 
justice requires the government to disclose material evidence of the 
defendant’s innocence.89 The Court grounded its decision in the idea 
that, regardless of request, the government cannot unjustly deprive a 
defendant of his liberty, noting that while “the attorney for the 
sovereign must prosecute the accused with earnestness and vigor, he 
 
(noting that Brady embodies the principle that the prosecutor should be 
“‘the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not 
escape or innocence suffer’”) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 
78, 88 (1935)). 
83. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 n.2 (quoting Judge Simon E. Sobeloff as Solicitor 
General in an address before the Judicial Conference of the Fourth 
Circuit on June 29, 1954). 
84. Id. at 87 (quoting an inscription on the walls of the Department of 
Justice). 
85. Id. at 87–88. 
86. 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
87. In Agurs, the named female defendant was convicted of murder for 
stabbing her husband, James Sewell, in the chest. Agurs’s main 
argument was that Sewell had attacked her and she was acting in self-
defense. While the prosecution had evidence of Sewell’s prior criminal 
record, including proof of his violent tendencies, Agurs was not made 
aware of the evidence until after her conviction and thus could never 
request it. Id. at 98–100. 
88. Id.  
89. Id. at 110. 
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must always be faithful to his client’s overriding interest that ‘justice 
be done.’”90 
Following Agurs, United States v. Bagley91 and Kyles v. Whitley92 
both addressed what evidence is considered material under Brady.93 
First, in Bagley, the Court determined that the defendant’s due 
process protections required finding a Brady violation if “‘there is a 
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’”94 
Kyles further clarified that the duty of determining materiality is 
wholly on the government. The prosecution alone can know whether 
certain information must be disclosed and has the responsibility to 
determine whether the effect of that information reaches the 
“reasonable probability” threshold set forth in Bagley.95 This imposes 
an affirmative duty on the prosecution to discover any evidence 
known by any governmental party, analyze it for materiality, and 
determine whether disclosure is required.96 
The modern-day formulation of the Brady Rule is articulated in 
Strickler v. Greene.97 In Strickler, the Court summarized a Brady 
violation as consisting of three main components. “The evidence at 
issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is 
exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have 
been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and 
prejudice must have ensued.”98 Again, in articulating this modern 
 
90. Id. at 110–11 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). 
Further quoting Berger, the Court explained that the government’s 
attorney “is the ‘servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that 
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.’” Id. at 111. 
91. 473 U.S. 667 (1985). 
92. 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
93. The materiality prong of Brady is integral to this discussion as it is the 
most difficult aspect of Brady’s practical application. Part III.C will 
elaborate on this difficulty and posit that similar difficulty will be 
infrequent—if not fully absent—in Brady’s application to SVP 
commitment proceedings. 
94. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. 
95. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. 
96. Id. 
97. 527 U.S. 263 (1999). 
98. Id. at 281–82. While it is easy to see the Brady Rule as a mandate that 
the state turn over all evidence that would be material to the 
defendant’s case, that is not technically accurate. Rather, the Brady 
Rule provides for a standard of judicial review when the defendant 
brings a claim that his due process protection was violated because the 
prosecution did not disclose certain evidence. Laurie L. Levensen, 
Discovery from the Trenches: The Future of Brady, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 
Discourse 74, 77 (2013). In an attempt to avoid Brady Rule review, a 
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definition more than thirty-five years after Brady v. Maryland, the 
Court cited its fundamental justification that the sovereign’s 
“obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to 
govern at all” and that the prosecution’s interest “is not that it shall 
win a case, but that justice shall be done.”99 
While it has been fifty years since Brady, and many feel that the 
appropriate application of the Brady Rule in the criminal context is 
anything but clear,100 it is important to keep in mind that the Brady 
Rule was the Court’s attempt at guaranteeing that when the 
defendant’s liberty is on the line, “prosecutors would place fairness 
over obtaining convictions.”101 The same need for protection against 
unjust deprivation of liberty inherent in the foundation of the Brady 
Rule is equally present in SVP commitment proceedings. Brady was 
meant to ensure a fair and just result through preventing the 
government from unilaterally determining whether a defendant is 
deprived of his or her freedom through the manipulation of evidence. 
As Part III will demonstrate, nowhere is unilateral evidence 
manipulation more possible than in the SVP commitment process. 
III. A Case for Brady Rule Protection in SVP 
Commitment Proceedings 
With the goals and polices behind both SVP commitment and the 
Brady Rule in mind, this Note will now illustrate why Brady should 
and can be applied successfully to SVP commitment proceedings. 
First, Part III.A will emphasize the quasi-criminal nature of SVP 
commitment proceedings, including how Brady has been applied in 
other quasi-criminal proceedings despite their “civil” classification. 
Second, Part III.B will explore the evidence presented in an SVP 
commitment proceeding and how the hearing’s result may be 
 
prudent prosecutor aware of the potential consequences will likely take 
proactive steps to provide the evidence to the defendant. Id. at 89. 
99. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281–82 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 
78, 88 (1935)). 
100. For a deeper discussion of the problems with Brady protection in the 
criminal context, see infra Part III.C. That discussion will address these 
difficulties and posit that such issues will be alleviated when Brady is 
applied to SVP civil commitment—meaning that the SVP civil 
commitment process will actually foster a simpler bright-line 
application. 
101. Michael J. Benza, Brady, Brady, Wherefore Art Thou Brady?, 57 Case 
W. Res. L. Rev. 567, 567 (2007); see also Bennett L. Gershman, 
Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 Case W. 
Res. L. Rev. 531, 531 (2007) (claiming that Brady “embodies, more 
powerfully than any other constitutional rule, the core of the 
prosecutor’s ethical duty to seek justice rather than victory”). 
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significantly influenced without the implementation of the Brady 
Rule. Lastly, in Part III.C, this Note will discuss the problems 
inherent in Brady’s current application in the criminal context. 
Because of the difference in the evidence presented in a typical 
criminal trial and SVP commitment proceedings, this Note will 
contend that Brady’s application to the latter will avoid the 
complications often found in its criminal application.  
A. The Quasi-Criminal Nature of SVP Commitment Proceedings 
One of the most obvious arguments against using Brady in the 
SVP commitment context is the formalistic contention that the Brady 
Rule was constructed in the criminal context and thus is inapplicable 
in civil proceedings. The Supreme Court has consistently stood by its 
determination that both SVP and traditional commitment are not 
punitive and has continuously rebuffed double-jeopardy attacks on 
the basis that SVP commitment is civil rather than criminal in 
nature.102 This distinction is based largely on the goals of criminal and 
civil statutes: the objective of criminal statutes being retribution and 
deterrence, and the objective of a civil statute being to prevent future 
harm through rehabilitative treatment.103 This perception becomes far 
less concrete in the face of pragmatic concerns associated with SVP 
commitment. Reality finds prosecutors acting without proper 
oversight in place to prevent evidence manipulation, while aiming to 
have individuals confined indefinitely. Furthermore, the characteris-
tics of SVP confinement, including the lack of any realistic treatment, 
undermine the supposed goals of these SVP statutes and suggest that 
while not formally criminal, SVP commitment has a substantial 
resemblance to criminal imprisonment. The relevant similarities 
between commitment proceedings and criminal proceedings indicate 
that the Brady safeguard need be instituted to provide adequate 
protection to those being committed.104  
 
102. See supra Part I. 
103. See Todd M. Grossman, Comment, Kansas v. Hendricks: The 
Diminishing Role of Treatment in the Involuntary Civil Confinement of 
Sexually Dangerous Persons, 33 New Eng. L. Rev. 475, 477–78 (1999) 
(contrasting the goals of civil and criminal statutes); Miller, supra note 
47, at 2105 (explaining the different purposes of criminal and civil laws). 
104. See Tsesis, supra note 13, at 269 (“Involuntary commitments are most 
closely related to criminal punishments because both adjudicate whether 
respondents whom society has found to be too dangerous should be at 
liberty.”). While outside the scope of this Note, it is worthwhile to 
acknowledge that some courts have posited that Brady may apply to 
even more traditional civil matters, such as any civil matter where a 
government agency is a party. See generally Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. 
FTC, 256 F. Supp. 136, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (“In civil actions, also, the 
ultimate objective is not that the Government ‘shall win a case, but 
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The first and most glaring similarity between SVP commitment 
and a traditional criminal proceeding is the nature of the 
government’s involvement. While the government can be, and 
regularly is, a party to civil lawsuits, the government’s position in an 
SVP commitment proceeding is much more akin to a prosecutor’s 
than a civil litigator’s. As an agent of the sovereign, the criminal 
prosecutor “effectively decides whether a person should live, die, be 
incarcerated for life, or receive special benefits and immunities.”105 
While the state’s attorney in an SVP commitment proceeding does 
not have the opportunity to choose whether his adversary lives or 
dies, he does, in most cases, attempt to deprive that person of his 
liberty indefinitely.  
The fact that the prosecutor is in such a position of power 
suggests that the system should not tolerate the same amount of 
“gamesmanship” as is found in civil litigation.106 Allowing attorneys 
more leeway for gamesmanship in typical civil litigation makes some 
logical sense. Traditionally, such circumstances often involve a 
disagreement over a sum of money, where one party’s gain is the 
other party’s loss. In such circumstances, it is natural to have an 
adversarial atmosphere and for attorneys to enable their client to 
recover or retain the maximum benefit possible. Rather than a party 
to a typical “zero-sum-game” civil matter, the State’s action in an 
SVP commitment proceeding is much more comparable to an act of 
police power. Like a criminal trial, the government and society gain 
no benefit if the prosecution “wins” the proceeding by unjustly 
committing an individual through withholding exculpatory evidence. 
As in a criminal trial, the state is meant to determine whether the 
defendant’s action or condition presents such a danger that he cannot 
safely function within the parameters of normal society and requires 
confinement.107 The result of an inaccurate commitment is not that 
the state gains at the committed party’s expense; rather the outcome 
is an unnecessary deprivation of liberty and a systematic 
delegitimization of the SVP commitment process. 
 
that justice shall be done.’”) (quoting Campbell v. United States, 365 
U.S. 85, 96 (1961)). 
105. Gershman, supra note 101, at 532; cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 
831 (1985) (finding that a governmental agency’s decision not to enforce 
is presumptively not subject to judicial review, in part because the 
decision to enforce is analogous to the decision to criminally prosecute). 
106. See Gershman, supra note 101, at 532 (arguing that while “U.S. 
litigation tolerates a certain amount of gamesmanship—especially in 
civil litigation,” there is no room for such tactics in criminal 
prosecution). 
107. See supra Part I.B. 
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In addition to this obvious social cost of unnecessarily depriving 
an individual of his personal liberty, the government suffers a 
significant economic harm by unnecessarily committing individuals. 
When the first SVP commitment statutes were enacted in the 
mid-1990s, the country was going through a time of economic growth, 
and states were much more willing to make significant investments in 
the institutions needed to carry out these laws.108 However, while the 
economy has since declined, the cost of commitment has not. In 2006, 
even before the significant economic downturn, states spent a total of 
$454 million on housing and treating civilly committed individuals.109 
On average, each state spent $94,000 per resident, which is four to 
five times higher than the costs associated with housing a prison 
inmate in those states.110 Such a drain on public resources may well be 
a worthwhile expenditure if it means that sexually violent predators 
are being treated and kept in a secure environment. However, it is 
economically disadvantageous to provide a committed defendant with 
expensive, needless treatment because he was illegitimately confined. 
Such waste is magnified by the fact that the fundamental reason for 
the extraordinary amount of government money spent on SVP 
commitment is the belief that the resources are being expended 
efficiently—going toward keeping only the most dangerous offenders 
confined.111 While these economic consequences may seem trivial 
compared to the clear social cost of wrongfully detaining an 
individual, it only emphasizes the state’s prosecutorial-like position in 
SVP commitment proceedings.  
The second aspect of SVP commitment proceedings that 
demonstrates their quasi-criminal nature is the custodial characteris-
tics of the confinement that can, and often does, follow. In most 
states, individuals who are committed under SVP commitment 
statutes remain committed indeterminately, until mental health 
 
108. See Andrew J. Harris, Civil Commitment of Sexual Predators: 
A Study in Policy Implementation 124 (2005) (“During that period, 
states appeared willing to make considerable investments in 
programming and facilities, and in so doing bolstered the policies’ 
organizational and legal foundations.”). 
109. Harris, supra note 5, at 363.  
110. See id. (noting that while $94,000 was the average, seven states spent 
over $100,000 per resident). These extraordinary costs continue to be 
one of the reasons why so many states have not adopted similar SVP 
commitment laws of their own. John Matthew Fabian, To Catch a 
Predator, and Then Commit Him for Life: Analyzing the Adam Walsh 
Act’s Civil Commitment Scheme Under 18 U.S.C. § 4248—Part One, 
The Champion, Feb. 2009, at 44, 45. 
111. See Prentky et al., supra note 56, at 371 (“Public policy is not well 
served if . . . extraordinary resources are squandered on those who pose 
low risk to public safety.”). 
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authorities conclude that the individual no longer poses a threat to 
society.112 Historically, traditional civil commitment statutes have 
been applied only to “individuals with the most serious psychiatric 
disorders,” and even then patients are usually “stabilized and released 
after approximately thirty days.”113 If a thirty-day treatment is 
common practice for traditional civil commitment, the indefinite time 
period used in SVP commitment statutes suggests the confinement is 
much more akin to a criminal sentence imposed to remove the 
individual from society rather than to treat and release him. 
This argument is strengthened by the lack of treatment options 
available to those who are committed as sexually violent. Many 
treatment regimens in SVP commitment facilities are often untried, 
and there is no way to ensure patient cooperation.114 Those patients 
who do choose to participate typically spend fewer than ten hours a 
week in treatment115 and are often at odds with the staff.116 Even 
when treatment is provided, the SVP statutes themselves can hamper 
the treatment’s rehabilitative value. The goal of a sexual offense 
therapist is to treat their patient by making “pro-social changes in 
their thoughts, feelings and behaviors, and thus reduce their risk of 
re-offending.”117 However, therapists’ ability to treat their patients 
successfully is hamstrung by requirements and treatment goals that 
are put in place—not by the therapist and patient, but by 
institutional policies implemented to achieve statutory objectives.118 
 
112. Id. at 380. For more discussion see supra Part I.B. 
113. Demleitner, supra note 9, at 1631–32. 
114. Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex 
Offenders After Prison, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 2007, at A20; see also 
Deming, supra note 36, at 447 (noting that, according to a May 2006 
study, the total number of committed sex offenders receiving sex 
offender treatment was only approximately 53%). 
115. Davey & Goodnough, supra note 114, at 21 (noting that while ten hours 
is the average, the actual number of hours and structure of the therapy 
differs significantly depending on the state). 
116. Prentky et al., supra note 56, at 380–81 (“Even if a relatively few, 
selected individuals are motivated to participate, the programs are often 
dominated by angry, litigious individuals who are in constant direct and 
indirect conflict with the staff.”). 
117. Rebecca L. Jackson & Christmas N. Covell, Sex Offender Civil 
Commitment: Legal and Ethical Issues, in The Wiley-Blackwell 
Handbook of Legal and Ethical Aspects of Sex Offender 
Treatment and Management 406, 418 (Karen Harrison & 
Bernadette Rainey eds., 2013). 
118. See id. (“[C]linicians in these settings may often be in the position of 
enforcing policies and facilitating institutional or system rules and 
practices that are punitive rather than rehabilitative or therapeutic, or 
that serve the function of justice under the guise of ‘treatment.’”). 
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For example, for certain patients only limited rehabilitation can be 
accomplished through in-house treatment, but SVP statutes require 
clinicians to continue spinning their wheels within the treatment 
facility long after such treatment is fruitful.119 While further 
rehabilitation could be achieved through limited release, the patient is 
prevented from this opportunity as legal restrictions typically prohibit 
any type of community release program, even though such a program 
is often necessary for continued treatment.120  
Essentially, the SVP commitment statutes impose a ceiling on 
treatment by both requiring and preventing full treatment. These 
practical barriers can turn SVP commitment into a perpetual cycle of 
continual commitment where the individual has no chance to be fully 
rehabilitated and discharged because some form of release is necessary 
to achieve full rehabilitation.121  
Regularly, even more fundamental treatment roadblocks occur, 
such as role confusion amongst staff therapists.122 Often, staff 
members are unsure whether their roles are as traditional therapists 
trying to rehabilitate their patients as effectively as possible in hopes 
of eventual release, or as agents of the government in place to help 
keep these ultra-dangerous individuals committed and away from 
society.123 This confusion is perpetuated by the fact that therapists are 
often asked to disclose the treatment record of committed 
individuals.124 Prosecutors, experts, and fact finders can then use these 
treatment records during all stages of the defendant’s subsequent 
commitment process.125 Such practices create an obvious conflict 
 
119. Id. 
120. Id.  
121. See Prentky et al., supra note 56, at 381 (“In this catch-22 world that is 
absent of specific concrete goals and objectives leading inexorably to 
program completion, as long as an individual is committed, his 
treatment team will prepare a treatment plan for the coming year, and 
for as long as the individual has recommended tasks listed on his 
treatment plan, he has not completed treatment.”); see also Miller, 
supra note 47, at 2095–96 (“This Catch-22 has larger, systematic 
implications. At the point that treatment is ‘mere pretext,’ serving more 
to propagate evidence for prosecution than to provide a legitimate 
opportunity for rehabilitation, civil commitment becomes 
constitutionally problematic.”). 
122. Prentky et al., supra note 56, at 381. 
123. See id. (explaining the problem with role confusion among treatment 
facility staff).  
124. See Miller, supra note 47, at 2108. Some courts require this disclosure 
under rules, which provide that such divulgence is not a violation of the 
defendant’s right to privacy. Id.  
125. Id. at 2109. 
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between the patient and the therapist, and leave the latter wondering 
where her loyalties lie. 
The environment of SVP commitment facilities also suggests SVP 
commitment is more criminal than civil. Generally, these designated 
locations are either specialized facilities created for the express 
purpose of civil commitment, facilities located within a working 
prison, or facilities within a secured psychiatric hospital.126 In any 
case, the setting of the commitment program is often “correctional in 
nature, where facilities, personnel and practices have a primary goal 
of community safety and security, rather than the well-being or 
therapeutic management of its residents.”127  
Additionally “[m]ost of the centers tend to look and feel like 
prisons, with clanking double doors, guard stations, fluorescent 
lighting, cinder-block walls, overcrowded conditions and tall fences 
with razor wire around the perimeters.”128 Moreover, most states place 
their centers in isolated areas.129 Perhaps most extreme is Washington 
State’s facility, which houses its committed sex offenders in a 
veritable leper’s colony on an island three miles off the coast in Puget 
Sound.130 Again, while these precautions may be necessary for those 
legitimately committed, such conditions exemplify the severe 
consequences facing a defendant in an SVP commitment procedure. 
The state’s position in the commitment proceedings, the indefinite 
span of commitment due to lack of sufficient treatment, and the 
conditions in which the committed patients are held suggest that SVP 
commitment proceedings are unlike any traditional civil matter and 
are akin to quasi-criminal hearings.131 Unlike in a typical civil 
proceeding, evidence manipulation in the SVP commitment setting 
would result in an unnecessary loss of liberty while not providing any 
benefit to the state. Overarching application of Brady at the federal 
and state level would not deprive the state of any advantage, and, 
considering the high cost of such gamesmanship, its implementation is 
 
126. Deming, supra note 36, at 444–45. 
127. Jackson & Covell, supra note 117, at 418. 
128. Davey & Goodnough, supra note 114, at 20–21. Unlike prisons, civil 
commitment centers receive very little independent oversight, which can 
lead to sex among offenders or between offenders and guards. Id.  
129. Id.; see also Deming, supra note 36, at 444 (noting that, as of 2008, 
every state—with the exception of Texas—that civilly committed sex 
offenders housed the committed offenders in a secured facility). 
130. Davey & Goodnough, supra note 114, at 21. 
131. See Deming, supra note 36, at 445 (suggesting that when individuals are 
committed to environments that appear to be correctional, they are 
likely to understand their situation as being punitive rather than 
rehabilitative, and this perception can change the way in which they 
participate in treatment). 
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necessary in the SVP commitment context. Moreover, it would 
provide much-needed unanimity amongst jurisdictions. A major 
obstacle inherent in SVP commitment’s precarious position between 
traditional civil and criminal jurisprudence is procedural 
uncertainty.132 Due to the patchwork nature of SVP commitment 
statutes in some states and even at the federal level, it is unclear 
whether civil or criminal discovery rules apply.133 Confusion breeds 
inconsistency, which is unacceptable when personal liberty is at stake. 
Blanket Brady protection would eliminate this confusion. While civil 
discovery practices could provide some level of protection, the quasi-
criminal nature of SVP commitment demands an unambiguous 
safeguard that cannot be forgone due to the inaction of counsel.134 As 
the preceding discussion has shown, the consequences of SVP com-
mitment hearings are severe and, as such, require protections that are 
triggered automatically and unequivocally—based solely on the fact 
that the defendant faces a criminal-like deprivation of liberty.135 
 
132. See supra Part I for a discussion regarding the Supreme Court’s failure 
to precisely define the breadth of the protections required for civil 
commitment hearings. 
133. See Yung, supra note 40, at 979 (explaining that one of the many rights 
not guaranteed by the AWA is the right to discovery); Fabian, supra 
note 110, at 46 (noting that the AWA does not specify discovery 
procedures); see also J. Harper Cook, Note, Civil Commitment of Sex 
Offenders: South Carolina’s Sexually Violent Predator Act, 50 S.C. L. 
Rev. 543, 562 (1999) (noting that one of the questions left open by the 
language of the South Carolinian SVP commitment statute is whether 
civil or criminal discovery rules apply). 
134. The disclosure requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
only require that initial disclosure be made of tangible items that the 
party may use to support its claims or of experts that the party may use 
at trial to present evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). Any 
exculpatory evidence is likely to be expert testimony or reports that do 
not support the government’s position. See infra Part III.B. Such 
evidence will be of no use to prosecutors at trial, and, therefore, they 
will not be required to disclose. Thus, if civil discovery protections 
applied, the onus would fall on the defense attorney to uncover the 
information through appropriate and timely use of discovery methods. 
135. While this unambiguous application of procedural protections is 
primarily required because of the criminal-like consequences of the SVP 
commitment hearing, of ancillary concern are the difficulties defense 
attorneys face in representing their clients in civil commitment matters. 
For a discussion regarding the information asymmetry, role confusion, 
and judicial influence that accompanies civil commitment defense, see 
Joseph Frueh, Note, The Anders Brief in Appeals from Civil 
Commitment, 118 Yale L.J. 272, 300–08 (2008); Phyllis Coleman & 
Ronald A. Shellow, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: A Call for a 
Stricter Test in Civil Commitments, 27 J. Legal Prof. 37, 55–60 
(2003). 
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This argument is bolstered by the fact that the Brady Rule has 
already been applied to other quasi-criminal proceedings, such as 
extradition proceedings. In Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky,136 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied Brady when the 
government withheld evidence during an extradition proceeding. 
Demjanjuk’s denaturalization, deportation, and extradition orders 
were based on the district court’s finding in a denaturalization 
hearing that Demjanjuk was “Ivan the Terrible,” a former Nazi guard 
at the concentration camp in Treblinka.137 A special master was 
appointed to determine the validity of Demjanjuk’s allegations that 
the government failed to disclose information that pointed to another 
guard as being “Ivan the Terrible,” thus exculpating him of the 
charges.138 The government argued that no such review was required 
since all the proceedings against Demjanjuk had been civil actions.139 
The Sixth Circuit, however, held that Brady should be extended to 
cover denaturalization and extradition cases, where the government’s 
case for denaturalization or extradition is based on the proof of 
alleged criminal activities.140  
More than an example of Brady’s use in a civil context, there are 
relevant similarities between Demjanjuk-like denaturalization and 
extradition cases and SVP commitment proceedings. The reasoning in 
Demjanjuk was that, due to the defendant’s alleged criminal activity, 
the consequences of the “civil” denaturalization and extradition were 
equal to that of a criminal conviction.141 The previous discussion has 
shown that, similarly, the consequences of SVP commitment, while 
not formally “punitive,” are custodial in all but the label. In both 
matters, the subject of the proceeding faces a significant deprivation 
of liberty: one party may be banished from his resident country to 
face potential incapacitation, and the other faces an indefinite  
136. 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993). 
137. Id. at 339. 
138. Id. at 340. 
139. Id. at 353. 
140. Id. (noting that if the government had sought denaturalization solely on 
the basis of Demjanjuk’s misrepresentations when he sought admission 
to the United States, the proceeding would only be civil in nature and 
Brady would not apply); see also John Apol & Paul J. Komives, 
Criminal Procedure, 1995 Detroit C. L. Rev. 475, 537 (1995) (“The 
court of appeals was of the opinion that the Brady rule should be 
extended to denaturalization and extradition cases if the government 
bases its case on alleged criminal activities by the party against whom 
the government is proceeding.”). 
141. See Apol & Komives, supra note 140, at 537 (noting that the Sixth 
Circuit believed that the “consequences of denaturalization and 
extradition are equal to or exceed the consequences of most criminal 
convictions”). 
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commitment. Additionally, part of the grounds for each proceeding is 
a showing of former criminal activity: the alleged war crimes in 
Demjanjuk and the prior sexually violent conduct required in SVP 
commitment statutes.142 In both cases the government’s role is much 
closer to prosecutorial than civil in nature, and the subject of the 
proceeding faces a significant loss of liberty. Because of these similarly 
heightened circumstances, it logically follows that the heightened 
safeguard required by the Sixth Circuit for certain cases of extradition 
and denaturalization should also be required in SVP commitment. 
B. Evidentiary Realities in SVP Commitment Hearings 
Proponents of SVP commitment admit that its goal is to protect 
society from a particular group of dangerous individuals143—not 
simply to prevent convicted sex offenders from returning to society. In 
fact, this limitation is what makes the state’s interest in confinement 
compelling enough for SVP statutes to be upheld as constitutional.144 
Thus, the government’s ability to confine someone who does not meet 
the required elements undermines the objective of SVP commitment 
and also its constitutionality. This problem is exacerbated by the 
evidentiary realities of the SVP commitment process that effectively 
allow the government to control the outcome of the proceeding 
through manipulative suppression of expert testimony. This section 
will discuss the almost outcome-determinative nature of expert 
testimony in SVP commitment hearings, which amplifies the 
importance of Brady’s evidentiary disclosure. 
1. The Enormous Influence of Expert Testimony 
As noted earlier, there are three elements of SVP commitment: 
(1) prior sexually harmful conduct, (2) a qualifying mental condition, 
and (3) a finding of future dangerousness.145 While some SVP 
commitment statutes lack a criminal conviction requirement, in most 
circumstances the commitment process targets individuals who have 
 
142. As will be discussed infra in Part III.B, most SVP commitment 
proceedings concern individuals who already have been convicted of a 
sexually violent crime. The obvious difference here is that SVP 
defendants have already served their sentence and Demjanjuk-like 
defendants face subsequent criminal prosecution. 
143. See Harris, supra note 5, at 340 (“Proponents of the laws have 
maintained that civil commitment represents a necessary stop-gap 
measure to protect society from a small but dangerous group of 
individuals who continue to pose a threat to society following 
completion of their formal criminal sanctions.”). 
144. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
145. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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served prison sentences for sexually based crimes.146 With this 
previous sex crime conviction, the government faces little or no 
difficulty in proving that the individual has previously engaged in 
harmful sexual conduct. For the latter two elements—qualifying 
condition and future dangerousness—the government relies heavily on 
the testimony of experts to make its case. 
Since the defendant in an SVP commitment hearing cannot be 
committed without a positive finding of both a qualifying condition 
and future dangerousness, the testimony of clinicians has become a 
critical element in these commitment proceedings.147 In presenting 
their opinions, these clinicians assume the role of experts.148 While this 
moniker is dubious in light of a clinician’s limited ability to predict 
these elements accurately,149 fact finders in civil commitment 
proceedings have traditionally relied heavily on clinician testimony.150 
In fact, this testimony is more or less determinative, with studies 
showing that “in general, clinicians’ opinions as to committability are 
dispositive.”151 
There are several reasons why judges give so much deference to 
this psychiatric testimony. First, most judges feel that they do not 
possess the ability to make an independent determination about 
whether the defendant meets the requisite elements.152 This is, at least 
in part, because judges rarely are given any training regarding 
 
146. Demleitner, supra note 9, at 1628; see also Grant H. Morris, Mental 
Disorder and the Civil/Criminal Distinction, 41 San Diego L. Rev. 
1177, 1192 (2004) (noting that SVP commitment is limited only to those 
“about to be released from confinement: sentence-expiring convicts, 
persons found mentally incompetent to stand trial, and insanity 
aquittees”). 
147. Shoba Sreenivasan et al., Expert Testimony in Sexually Violent Predator 
Commitments: Conceptualizing Legal Standards of “Mental Disorder” 
and “Likely to Reoffend,” 31 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 471, 472 
(2003). 
148. William M. Brooks, The Tail Still Wags the Dog: The Pervasive and 
Inappropriate Influence by the Psychiatric Profession on the Civil 
Commitment Process, 86 N.D. L. Rev. 259, 284 (2010). 
149. The accuracy, or lack thereof, of this “expert” testimony will be 
discussed at length in Part III.B.2 infra. 
150. Brooks, supra note 148, at 284–85. 
151. MELTON ET AL., supra note 16, at 349 (“Studies indicate an agreement 
rate between clinicians’ conclusions and factfinders’ decisions of between 
90% and 100%.”); see also Yung, supra note 40, at 971–72 (noting an 
environment where courts are “largely rubberstamping the federal civil 
commitment of sex offenders allowed under the Adam Walsh Child 
Protection and Safety Act”).  
152. Brooks, supra note 148, at 285–86. 
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psychiatric diagnosis or treatment.153 Additionally, judges do not want 
to stand in the way of treatment for those who need care.154 The 
desire not to interfere with vital treatment results in judges taking a 
hands-off approach to reviewing psychiatric testimony.155 A third 
reason relates to the policies that often drive the enactment of SVP 
commitment laws. The judge, afraid that a wrong decision will result 
in a dangerous individual going free, will err strongly on the side of 
the clinician’s testimony because the consequences of letting a 
dangerous individual go seem much more alarming than the harm of 
committing a sex offender who does not legally qualify as sexually 
dangerous.156  
This expert testimony becomes no less influential when the 
defendant requests a jury in lieu of a judicial fact finder. Though 
many in the legal system have grave concerns that psychiatric expert 
testimony in general is beyond the scope of a normal juror’s 
understanding,157 these laypeople are still trusted to accurately assess 
this complicated, technical evidence that even experienced judges 
continually struggle with.158 Predictably, jury members side with 
expert testimony a significant amount of the time. One study, using a 
representative jury sample, found that after expert testimony was 
presented by the government, the number of jurors voting for 
commitment jumped from 57 percent to 82 percent.159 In addition to 
the weight given to this evidence is the natural distrust inherent in 
society’s perception of sex offenders. Generally, society views 
committed sex offenders as mentally unsound and considers their 
 
153. Id. at 285. 
154. Id. at 286. 
155. Id.  
156. Id. 
157. See Ellen Byers, Mentally Ill Criminal Offenders and the Strict Liability 
Effect: Is There Hope for a Just Jurisprudence in an Era of 
Responsibility/Consequences Talk?, 57 Ark. L. Rev. 447, 499–500 
(2004) (discussing how “courts are ambivalent about jurors’ intellectual 
capacities to evaluate evidence of mental disorder”). 
158. See id. at 498–99 (noting that, despite questions of jurors’ ability to 
interpret the evidence, states rely on predictions of future dangerousness 
to civilly commit sex offenders). 
159. Krauss et al., supra note 43, at 29. The study was conducted using 156 
jurors in Southern California who had been called for jury duty but were 
not ultimately selected to serve. Id. at 24. These jurors were shown a 
reenactment of an Arizona SVP commitment trial, with certain groups 
being presented with clinical expert testimony and others with actuarial 
expert testimony. Id. at 24–27. In both cases the expert testified for the 
state. Id. at 27. The relevant findings were determined by polling the 
jurors for their verdict once after opening statements and once after 
expert testimony, cross-examination, and judicial instructions. Id. at 29.  
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release risky due to an exaggerated belief that their recidivism is 
inordinately high.160 This predisposition, coupled with the difficulty in 
handling expert evidence, suggests that juries as well as judges will 
agree with the conclusions reached by the testifying expert. 
Perhaps these same concerns are responsible for the considerably 
lower threshold of admissibility for expert testimony in SVP commit-
ment proceedings.161 Typically courts have applied one of two 
standards in determining the admissibility of expert testimony.162 The 
first comes from the 1923 case of Frye v. United States,163 which held 
that expert testimony is acceptable if it has “gained general 
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”164 The second 
standard comes from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,165 
which focused on whether the evidence in question can be tested, 
whether it has been subjected to peer review, and whether it has a 
known rate of error, among other factors.166 However, in SVP 
commitment proceedings, courts tend not to adopt either of these 
well-known standards.167 Instead, courts tend to take any concerns 
 
160. See Yung, supra note 40, at 973–74 (discussing statistics compiled by 
the Department of Justice and Bureau of Justice Statistics that 
contradict the public perception that sex offenders have an extra-
ordinarily high rate of recidivism); cf. Nicholas Scurich & Daniel A. 
Krauss, The Effect of Adjusted Actuarial Risk Assessment on Mock-
Jurors’ Decisions in a Sexual Predator Commitment Proceeding, 53 
Jurimetrics J. 395, 407–08 (conducting a study to determine the effect 
of adjusted actuarial risk assessment on mock-jurors decision making in 
SVP commitment proceedings and positing that one reason for the lack 
of effect is that jurors were simply “seek[ing] out information that is 
congenial to their preferred outcome”). 
161. See Harris, supra note 5, at 356 (“[I]t appears that the threshold for 
admissibility of expert predictions of future violence in SVP proceedings 
is quite low . . . .”). 
162. Id. 
163. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
164. Id. at 1014. 
165. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
166. Id. at 593–95. 
167. See Harris, supra note 5, at 357 (noting that in SVP commitment 
proceedings courts have rarely applied Frye or Daubert admissibility 
rules with any real force); Fabian, supra note 51, at 38–39 (noting that 
while Daubert may be the applicable standard “state courts hearing 
sexually violent predator (SVP) cases have consistently admitted clinical 
judgment testimony establishing low levels of reliability in the 
courtroom”). Courts generally do not analyze any actuarial risk/future 
dangerousness assessments under Daubert, and there has been minimal 
critique of the quality of actuarial assessments. The only such critiques 
typically come in the form of lone dissents or concurrences. Hamilton, 
supra note 46, at 738. 
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they may have about the reliability of the evidence into consideration 
when calculating the weight of the evidence as a whole.168 
This extraordinary deference, coupled with the low admissibility 
standards, demonstrates the shocking level of control experts may 
have on the outcome of SVP commitment procedures. With the first 
prong of the three-prong proof requirement being fulfilled by prior 
convictions or sexually criminal activity, the remainder of the proof is 
left in the hands of experts to whom the fact finder consistently 
defers. Without full disclosure of exculpatory expert testimony, the 
fact finder will be guided to his decision by an expert whom the 
prosecution can handpick based on his advantageous conclusion. The 
extraordinary amount of power this allows the state to wield cannot 
be overstated and dwarfs any formalistic “civil vs. criminal” argu-
ment. When expert testimony essentially decides whether an 
individual is deprived of his liberty indefinitely, the need for a 
disclosure requirement becomes even more vital than in the criminal 
context, where one piece of evidence rarely has such impact. If so 
little evidence can determine so much, at minimum all available 
evidence must be heard and considered. 
2. Variations in Expert Assessment 
Even though these clinical determinations are rarely challenged in 
court, there are still major questions concerning their reliability. In 
SVP commitment hearings, clinical experts must make two separate 
determinations: (1) whether the individual being assessed has a 
qualifying mental condition, and (2) whether that mental condition 
will keep the individual from refraining from dangerous sexual activity 
in the future.169 It is far from clear that clinicians can accurately 
assess either criterion.170  
One of the most basic problems with the qualifying condition 
determination is the lack of a well-defined standard.171 Based on the 
variation between legal and medical standards, there is confusion 
regarding what specific mental conditions are actually qualifying 
mental disorders for the purposes of SVP commitment, despite the 
fact that mental illness as a threshold for commitment is considered a 
 
168. Harris, supra note 5, at 357.  
169. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
170. See Tsesis, supra note 13, at 282–83 (“The ambiguities of the two 
criteria the Supreme Court relie[s] on . . . for involuntary institution-
alization—dangerousness and mental illness—are well documented in 
the psychiatric literature.”). 
171. See Sreenivasan et al., supra note 147, at 473 (noting that as of 2003, 
thirteen states defined the necessary mental condition in similar 
language, while four other states used different, more comprehensive 
standards). 
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constitutional requirement for involuntary commitment statutes.172 A 
main point of contention stems from the use of legal definitions that 
do not necessarily correspond with clinical assessments. In fact, the 
authors of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM)—which forms the basis of the criteria most often used by 
psychiatric professionals in making their assessments—recognized that 
using its criteria in legal matters could lead to the misuse of diagnoses 
that do not truly meet the requisite legal threshold for mental 
disorders.173  
This issue was addressed by the Court in Hendricks, where the 
committed defendant argued that a committed individual must suffer 
from a “mental illness,” a term coined by the psychiatric community, 
rather than simply a “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder,” 
which were legal terms coined by the Kansas legislature.174 He argued 
that setting the bar below the scientific standard of “mental illness” 
did not satisfy his substantive due process rights, and specifically that 
his diagnosed pedophilia should not be included as a qualifying 
mental condition.175  
The Hendricks Court elected not to restrict the requisite 
qualifying condition to the more narrow “mental illness,” particularly 
noting that psychiatrists themselves “disagree widely and frequently 
on what constitutes mental illness.”176 The Court found that legal 
terms used to define mental health concepts often “do not fit precisely 
with the definitions employed by the medical community,” such as in 
cases of insanity and competency.177 Thus, the legal threshold set 
forth by Kansas was satisfactory as it considered the same criteria as 
other approved civil commitment statutes, such as “criteria relating 
to an individual’s inability to control his dangerousness.”178 This 
inability to control one’s impulses (volitional impairment), however, 
has become a highly debated criterion. Psychiatric professionals argue 
that this concept cannot be analyzed successfully as even professional 
medical experts cannot reliably distinguish between an “irresistible  
172. See Prentky et al., supra note 56, at 362 ([D]angerousness alone cannot 
support civil commitment. In some way . . . it is the additional presence 
of a mental disorder that transforms the deprivation of liberty from 
unconstitutional preventive detention to constitutional civil 
commitment.”). 
173. Tsesis, supra note 13, at 258. 
174. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358–59 (1997); see also Sreenivasan 
et al., supra note 147, at 474. 
175. Sreenivasan et al., supra note 147, at 474. 
176. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359 (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 
(1985)). 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 360. 
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impulse” and an “impulse not resisted.”179 The American Psychiatric 
Association (APA) feels so strongly that volitional impairment is 
impossible to reliably assess that the organization made a joint 
recommendation that the volitional prong of the American Law 
Institute’s 1962 insanity defense standard be dropped.180 
The inability to diagnose volitional impairment was the focus of 
the 2002 case of Kansas v. Crane,181 which again challenged the 
Kansas SVP commitment laws. The Supreme Court reviewed how 
much control must be lacking for a person’s mental abnormality to be 
considered a qualifying condition under the SVP commitment statute. 
The Crane Court, like the Hendricks Court, did not lay down a 
precise standard for how much “inability to control” must be present 
but found that it does not need to be a complete lack of control.182 
The Court went on to suggest that it would be enough if there was 
proof the individual had a “serious” difficulty controlling his actions, 
since inability to control one’s impulses will never be able to be 
demonstrated “with mathematical precision.”183  
This ambiguous language, as one would expect, did not provide 
much guidance for the lower courts. Many responded to the broad 
language by giving volitional impairment a wide scope, applying the 
language with considerable flexibility.184 The loose requirement that a 
mental abnormality include some volitional impairment essentially 
allows the past actions of the individual to dictate the diagnosis as, 
under these terms, past sexual crimes themselves suggest an inability 
to control.185 This could permit any number of mental conditions to 
qualify an individual for commitment if coupled with a prior crime 
suggesting volitional impairment. Such liberal interpretation becomes 
most dangerous with borderline conditions, such as antisocial 
personality disorder, where some of those diagnosed would meet 
 
179. Harris, supra note 5, at 354. 
180. Prentky et al., supra note 56, at 363. 
181. 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
182. Id. at 411. 
183. Id. at 413. 
184. See Harris, supra note 5, at 355 (noting that “the Crane ruling 
effectively relegated volitional impairment to a rhetorical concept with 
little substantive bearing on the commitment process”); Fabian, supra 
note 110, at 50 (noting that a sex offender with any type of mental 
illness, disorder or abnormality can be involuntarily committed under 
the AWA “if they have volitional impairments and serious difficulties in 
controlling behavior that ultimately lead to sexually violent acts”). 
185. See Harris, supra note 5, at 355 (“Just as the concept of mental 
abnormality may be driven largely by the nature of the individuals’ 
prior behaviors, the volitional impairment criterion may in turn be 
viewed as similarly circular in its logic and application.”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 1·2014 
Preventing Partisan Commitment 
242 
“inability to control” criterion while others would not.186 Thus, its 
inclusion as a qualifying condition may ensnare individuals who may 
not actually meet the requisite criteria. This comes along with even 
more fundamental issues, such as concerns that the classification 
system used by clinicians focuses on criteria that can be discussed 
only in the abstract and are not applicable to the real world.187  
Even more alarming than the broad standards for determining an 
individual’s qualifying condition is the difficulty experts face in 
determining an individual’s future dangerousness. There are two 
methods by which experts develop their opinions regarding an 
individual’s risk of future dangerousness. The first method consists of 
the expert performing an unstructured analysis of the specific factors 
of an individual’s situation and testifying to his or her own clinical 
judgment.188 The second is to rely on an actuarial instrument that 
weighs a number of different variables unique to each commitment 
subject to generate a percentage of risk for that person.189 
Experts who rely solely on clinical judgment are often criticized as 
inaccurate because many believe that empirical data are essential to a 
reliable finding.190 These clinical judgments may result in such 
unreliable outcomes because, rather than gathering information in a 
systematic manner, experts who use clinical judgment alone often 
refrain from any type of structured methods and instead rely on their 
 
186. See Sreenivasan et al., supra note 147, at 476 (“[W]hile some individuals 
with Antisocial Personality Disorder meet the requisite mental criteria 
under SVP/SDP Acts, it could be argued that not all sex offenders with 
such a diagnosis should be committed as an SVP/SDP.”); see also 
Fabian, supra note 51, at 34 (“The question remains whether a 
personality disorder diagnosis alone or the presence of psychopathy 
qualifies a sex offender to have a serious difficulty refraining from future 
sexual conduct.”). 
187. See Jackson & Covell, supra note 117, at 413 (noting that there has 
been much debate regarding the reliability of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders). 
188. Sreenivasan et al., supra note 147, at 479; see also Fredrick E. Vars, 
Rethinking the Indefinite Detention of Sex Offenders, 44 Conn. L. Rev. 
161, 164 (2011) (“The two primary methods of determining the 
likelihood of recidivism are clinical judgment and so-called actuarial risk 
assessment instruments.”); Fabian, supra note 51, at 38 (characterizing 
the clinical judgment method as “unstructured clinical decision 
making”). 
189. Sreenivasan et al., supra note 147, at 478. 
190. See Brooks, supra note 148, at 271–72 (noting that “statistical studies 
have demonstrated that assessments of risk based on empirical data are 
more accurate than the clinical method” and that “statistical predictions 
yielded relatively lower false positive rates [than clinical predictions]”). 
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instincts as professionals.191 Additionally, there is some concern that 
clinicians have a relatively narrow view of what characteristics should 
be taken into consideration.192 This idiosyncratic method is bolstered 
somewhat when experts use guided assessments, which base clinical 
assessments on a review of risk factors that have been determined 
from more empirical research.193 Surprisingly, however, whether 
guided or unguided, clinical opinions are generally accepted by the 
court,194 allowing the defendant’s fate to be decided by “judgments 
that ultimately rest on the arbitrary opinion of a mental health 
professional.”195  
Even conclusions made by utilizing actuarial instruments—the 
method generally accepted as the more reliable—are hardly regarded 
as the epitome of accuracy. These tools consist of scales created using 
prior analyses, which identify variables that best differentiate between 
those sex offenders who will reoffend and those who will not.196 Based 
on how strongly each variable predicts the likelihood of recidivism, 
these variables are given weighted values, and the values are then 
turned into probabilities.197 Clinicians can then use these scales to 
assess the probability that a specific defendant with a certain number 
of these characteristics will reoffend.  
Most of the concern with this method revolves around the 
accuracy of actuarial tools themselves.198 First, the application of the 
typical actuarial factors may result in an analysis that is both too 
broad and too narrow. In the design process, the actuarial risk levels 
may have been determined using generic behaviors that the 
 
191. See id. at 272 (“[T]he exercise of clinical judgment related to an 
assessment of risk may well depend on murky and ambiguous clinical 
hunches.”); Prentky et al., supra note 56, at 371 (referring to clinical 
risk assessments as “an exercise in human judgment”). 
192. See Harris, supra note 5, at 356 (voicing concern that the mental health 
field fails to rely on important characteristics such as “responses to 
treatment, situational stressors, availability of social supports, and 
employment or housing status”). 
193. Sreenivasan et al., supra note 147, at 481. 
194. A recent study has found that jurors, in fact, “favor[] less scientifically 
valid unstructured clinical expert testimony over more accurate 
actuarial assessment in a realistic mock SVP hearing.” Krauss et al., 
supra note 43, at 33. 
195. Prentky et al., supra note 56, at 370; see also Sreenivasan et al., supra 
note 147, at 481 (“Those critical of clinical judgment have argued that 
such opinions represent ‘unguided’ efforts that are frequently 
inaccurate.”). 
196. Prentky et al., supra note 56, at 373. 
197. Id. 
198. Jackson & Covell, supra note 117, at 415. 
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evaluating clinician does not wish to incorporate into his analysis199 
and thus encompass factors the practicing clinician does not feel 
belong in the diagnosis. Relatedly, these actuarial tools cover only the 
probability of future dangerousness for a general category of person, 
based on the variables or behaviors measured by the tool.200 Thus, its 
results may be overbroad and categorize defendants too generically 
rather than assessing the individual’s actual risk based on other 
personal variables. In addition to this overbreadth, an antithetical 
difficulty with this one-size-fits all design is that the tools may not be 
inclusive enough to incorporate all the factors relevant to determining 
the future risk of a specific SVP commitment subject.201 In fact, 
research suggests a great number of risk factors that are not currently 
included in such actuarial measurements could potentially improve 
the tool’s diagnostic capability.202 A recent study suggests that the 
Static-99, “the most thoroughly researched tool for predicting sexual 
recidivism,” does not, on its own, predict recidivism well enough to 
reach the standard required for SVP commitment.203 
So what does this analysis of the expert’s role in SVP 
commitment proceedings indicate? First, the great weight given to 
expert testimony suggests that the Brady Rule should be applied to 
SVP commitment proceedings. When expert testimony essentially 
acts as dispositive evidence, the government can drastically shape the 
 
199. See id. For example, the tool may suggest a particular probability of 
dangerousness but when that probability was determined, non-contact 
offenses were included in the assessment even though the diagnosing 
clinician does not believe those behaviors should be included in the risk 
assessment. 
200. See id. (explaining that these determinations “rely on comparisons of an 
individual to a reference group”). 
201. Id. The current ten-factor diagnostic for the STATIC-99 actuarial tool 
consists of: (1) aged twenty-five or older; (2) ever lived with lover for at 
least two years; (3) index non-sexual violence—any convictions; (4) 
prior non-sexual violence—any convictions; (5) prior sex offenses; (6) 
prior sentencing data; (7) any convictions for non-contact sex offenses; 
(8) any unrelated victims; (9) any stranger victims; (10) any male 
victims. Yung, supra note 40, at 981. 
202. Jackson & Covell, supra note 117, at 416. These include regularly 
considered factors such as treatment participation or completion as well 
as relatively untested, dynamic factors such as intimacy, self-regulation, 
and social influences. Id.; see also Fabian, supra note 51, at 33 (claiming 
that actuarial tools “overlook the clinically complex elements of 
assessing volitional abilities in relationship to the offender’s mental 
abnormality”). 
203. See Vars, supra note 188, at 193 (suggesting, after a lengthy empirical 
study, that the answer to whether the STATIC-99 can predict 
recidivism at the level required to meet the legal standard was “mixed 
and qualified, but largely negative”). 
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outcome of the proceeding by selecting an ideal expert who best 
supports its claim and presenting only that testimony.204 Moreover, 
when judges do not set a threshold admissibility standard for this 
expert testimony and instead rely upon a totality of the evidence 
determination, each piece of adverse evidence becomes integral in 
establishing a realistic context. The importance of disclosure is 
amplified further by the relatively unreliable nature of the evidence 
being presented. Without disclosure, fact finders base their 
determinations on the opinions of experts handpicked by the 
government, even though one expert’s methods and conclusions may 
be wildly different from another’s. The extreme prejudice created by 
the current use of expert testimony has led some to call for sweeping 
reforms. At least one commentator has suggested that expert 
testimony based solely on clinical judgment should be banned from 
the prosecution’s case in chief altogether.205 
Rather than excluding certain forms of expert testimony, 
application of Brady protection would simply require that all available 
expert testimony be shared. When such varied expert analysis carries 
so much weight, the only way to add proper context is to present the 
entire range of analyses and conclusions. Otherwise, the one or two 
experts chosen by the government to testify may look far more 
convincing than is accurate.206 This reasoning is supported by a recent 
study that set out to determine the significance of actuarial risk 
scoring on jurors.207 While its results suggested that the specific risk 
measures did not matter to the jurors, the findings underscore the 
 
204. This is the exact discretion the government argued it possessed in 
United States v. Edwards, 777 F. Supp. 2d 985, 989 (E.D.N.C. 2011); 
see supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text. 
205. Christopher Slobogin, Proving the Unprovable: The Role of 
Law, Science, and Speculation in Adjudicating Culpability and 
Dangerousness 124 (2007). Rather, the author suggests a 
“Subject-First Regime” where the prosecution’s use of clinical prediction 
expert testimony is contingent on the defendant’s own use of that 
evidence. Id. at 125–28. Like the character evidence rule, if the 
defendant opens the door through his own use of clinical prediction 
expert testimony, then the state may answer with its own. Id. at 127.  
206. For example, a portion of expert testimony may seem perfectly rea-
sonable when it is accompanied only by evidence that supports the 
government’s position. In the context of exculpatory evaluations 
withheld by the government, however, the unreliable nature of this 
seemingly reasonable evidence is likely to emerge and the fact-finder can 
give it the amount of evidentiary weight it deserves. 
207. Marcus T Boccaccini et al., Do Scores from Risk Measures Matter to 
Jurors?, 19 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 259 (2013). The study was 
conducted using actual jurors from twenty-six SVP commitment 
hearings who were asked questions immediately following their 
deliberation and verdict. Id. at 260–62. 
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importance of context in SVP expert testimony.208 According to the 
authors, “our jurors were more skeptical of experts’ (no side specified) 
ability to predict recidivism when they heard testimony from 
opposing experts as opposed to a state expert only.” 209 These findings 
exemplify the importance of full disclosure. Presenting contradictory 
expert testimony allows the fact finder to give the government’s 
expert evidence the amount of weight it deserves, which is especially 
important considering the unreliability of certain methods of analysis. 
Unfortunately, fact finders often are not allowed this perspective.210 
Application of Brady would facilitate this vital context, as the 
government would not be able to keep any exculpatory reports from 
defendants, who would then be able to present them at trial. 
C. Bright-Line Application of Brady in SVP Commitment 
The final argument for Brady’s application to SVP commitment 
proceedings is the relative ease in which it could be applied. Brady’s 
application to SVP commitment proceedings would be implemented 
with significantly less confusion or exploitation than currently 
accompanies its use in criminal proceedings. Since the Brady Rule 
applies only when the state has withheld material evidence,211 the 
most critical determination made by the government is whether the 
evidence it wishes to withhold is significant enough to change the 
outcome of the proceeding.212 This condition basically requires the 
prosecution to look at each piece of evidence and determine whether 
that item could make a difference to the defendant’s argument 
without having personal knowledge of that argument.  
The diverse nature and sheer amount of evidence introduced in a 
criminal trial makes it difficult for prosecutors to be sure when to 
disclose and has led to inconsistencies in disclosures amongst 
prosecutors.213 Some interpret Brady liberally and try to deduce 
 
208. See id. at 266 (discussing the importance of testimony presented on 
behalf of the commitment defendant). 
209. Id. Specifically, there were seven of the twenty-six hearings in which an 
expert testified on the defendant’s behalf, and in those hearings jurors 
indicated that they saw the defendant as less likely to reoffend than the 
defendants in the other nineteen hearings. Id. 
210. In the Boccaccini et al. study, there were at least two government 
experts in twenty-five out of the twenty-six hearings, and only seven 
hearings included any expert testimony on behalf of the defendant. Id. 
211. See supra Part II. 
212. See Levenson, supra note 98, at 77 (“An essential aspect of Brady has 
always been the determination of whether the undisclosed evidence 
really would have made a significant difference in the case.”). 
213. See Peter A. Joy, Brady and Jailhouse Informants: Responding to 
Injustice, 57 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 619, 630 (2007) (noting that, in 
the traditional criminal context, prosecutorial discretion “to determine 
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whether the specific piece of evidence could potentially have an effect 
on the outcome, while others read the rule narrowly and only disclose 
when a party other than the defendant has confessed to the alleged 
crime.214 Moreover, prosecutors are aware and take advantage of the 
lack of oversight mechanisms and the absence of any real professional 
discipline.215 The result has been “a hodgepodge of judgments about 
the nature and extent of favorable information to be disclosed to 
defendants.”216 Such confusion has led to a number of subsequent 
adjustments to Brady’s application by the lower courts. 
In an attempt to combat the materiality problem, courts have 
suggested modifications to Brady that take the onus off the 
prosecution. One example is the adoption of a due diligence rule. 
While there are three general variations, the rule essentially removes 
the burden imposed on the state by Brady when the defendant knew 
or should have known of the evidence himself.217 The basis for this 
rule at least partially stems from the idea that the defendant knows 
better than the prosecution whether certain evidence will be material 
to his defense.218 This method has been criticized for creating a new 
prong of Brady and overstating the defendant’s ability to know what 
is material to his own trial.219  
On the other end of the spectrum, courts have begun using 
“open-file” polices under which the government is required to provide 
the defendant with everything in its possession.220 Sharing all of the 
prosecutorial files serves two benefits. First, it leaves no doubt that 
the government prosecutor is following Brady, as all the evidence will 
 
what constitutes exculpatory evidence and when to disclose it . . . has 
led to inconsistent decisions”). 
214. See Robert W. Tarun, Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, Proposal, Proposed 
Codification of Disclosure of Favorable Information Under Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure 11 and 16, 41 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 93, 103–
04 (2004) (discussing the different interpretations of what is considered 
“exculpatory” under Brady). 
215. See Joy, supra note 213, at 631 (discussing the ways in which 
prosecutors can exploit Brady loopholes). 
216. Tarun, supra note 214, at 115. 
217. See Kate Weisburd, Prosecutors Hide, Defendants Seek: The Erosion of 
Brady Through the Defendant Due Diligence Rule, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 
138, 154–56 (2012) (explaining the three variations of the due diligence 
rule in greater detail). 
218. See id. at 167–74 (discussing the “myth” that defendants are in a better 
position to determine whether evidence is exculpatory). 
219. See id. (explaining misconceptions inherent in the foundation of the due 
diligence rule). 
220. Levensen, supra note 98, at 84. 
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be disclosed.221 Second, it eliminates the difficult task prosecutors face 
in attempting to determine what evidence is material, instead 
allowing the defendant to make the decision personally.222 However, 
this method has been criticized for authorizing prosecutors to send 
hundreds of documents to the defense without identifying the 
important information, effectively hiding the exculpatory information 
in plain sight.223  
These potential solutions, while obviously imperfect, are attempts 
to respond to the difficulty in Brady’s application. Practitioners in the 
criminal context desire a comprehensible definition of Brady 
materiality in order to remedy these interpretive difficulties and to 
facilitate order and justice.224 Such ambiguity will not be a problem in 
Brady’s application to SVP commitment, however, as determining the 
material nature of exculpatory evidence will not be difficult. As was 
discussed at length, in most SVP commitment proceedings, the 
ultimate question comes down to whether the subject has a qualifying 
condition and whether there is a risk of future dangerousness.225 These 
questions are almost wholly resolved by expert testimony or reports. 
With such little evidence being presented, very little evidence needs to 
be analyzed. Moreover, this Note has further demonstrated that fact 
finders make their decisions in line with the clinical expert testimony 
almost exclusively.226 Thus, unlike in the criminal context, there 
would be no question about the materiality of such evidence. Since 
such expert testimony is likely to be outcome determinative, there can 
be no argument that it will not influence the outcome of the case. 
Essentially, the Brady Rule could have bright-line applicability. If the 
government employs a clinical expert to review the defendant, that 
report must be disclosed due to its highly material nature. Any 
suppression would result in an automatic Brady violation. Rules that 
are easily understood are easily applied, and since SVP commitment 
decisions are determined using such little evidence that is so highly 
material, the requirements of the Brady Rule can be easily interpreted 
 
221. Joy, supra note 213, at 641–42. 
222. Id. 
223. See Levensen, supra note 98, at 85 (explaining that, with such a 
“discovery dump,” prosecutors can hide critical evidence like a needle in 
a haystack). 
224. See, e.g., Tarun, supra note 214, at 115 (“A clear definition of favorable 
information will help eliminate disparate interpretations of the Brady 
obligation by both prosecutors and defense counsel and give prosecutors 
clear guidance, thereby promoting equal treatment of similarly situated 
defendants under the law.”). 
225. See supra Part III.B.2. 
226. See supra Part III.B.1. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 1·2014 
Preventing Partisan Commitment 
249 
and will result in none of the confusion typical of its application in 
the criminal context.  
Conclusion 
The current state of SVP commitment allows the government to 
effectively act as architects of the proceeding’s final outcome. This 
was the precise situation the Court aimed to avoid by enacting the 
Brady Rule in criminal trials. While the Supreme Court has 
continually found civil commitment to be rehabilitative rather than 
punitive, the role of the government and severe consequences of SVP 
commitment liken it to something much closer to a criminal 
proceeding than a traditional civil matter. Accordingly, SVP 
commitment requires application of the heightened Brady protection. 
Moreover, Brady’s use in extradition hearings—a similarly 
quasi-criminal hearing—suggests that the rule’s utilization in SVP 
commitment proceedings would not be a drastic shift from what 
already occurs in practice elsewhere. 
Additionally, the original objectives of SVP commitment statutes 
were to offer rehabilitation and protect society from a specific group 
of dangerous individuals. However, these just and constitutional goals 
cannot be truly achieved if the government can manipulate outcome-
determinative expert testimony in order to confine those who do not 
meet the requisite threshold of dangerousness. While it is clear that 
SVP commitment can be effective when the process is tailored to 
meet the proper objectives, the entire system is delegitimized when 
the State withholds evidence that would prevent an unnecessary loss 
of liberty. If Brady Rule application can remedy this problem with 
little confusion or negative effects, a formalistic “civil v. criminal” 
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